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''Fairly Well Known and 
Need Not be Discussed'' 
Colonel A. F. Duguid and the 
Canadian Official History 
of the First World War 
Wes Gustavson 
I n 1938, Colonel Archer Fortescue Duguid published the first and only volume of his 
Canadian official history of the First World War. 
It was eagerly anticipated as the Historical 
Section had been directed to compile such a 
history in 1921, and many veterans as well as 
the public were puzzled by the delay in 
publication. Despite this, however, reviewers 
were generally satisfied with the results. Writing 
in the Legionary, W.W. Murray declared it "a 
masterly work of great care and precision," while 
W.B. Kerr believed that it would form the basis 
for all future works on the subject. 1 It was hoped 
that the positive response would hasten 
completion of the remaining seven volumes; but 
nine years later and with seemingly little 
progress made, the project was cancelled. 
Although the initial reaction was favourable, 
it would not prove to be lasting. Today, Duguid's 
history is often overlooked for Colonel G.W.L. 
Nicholson's Canadian Expeditionary Force, 
1914-1919 (1962), a one volume history of the 
entire war. Duguid is generally thought of- when 
thought of at all- as apathetic, unqualified, and 
through his failure, having deprived Canadians 
a record of an important episode in their history. 2 
Having "missed the boat" as one critic put it, 
Duguid and his work have subsequently been 
consigned to the background of Canadian 
military history, the positive reviews having been 
long since forgotten. :1 Thus, there have been few 
attempts to fully explain why the official history 
was never completed, historians, instead, 
preferring to lament its absence and generally 
point to Duguid's alleged shortcomings as an 
explanation. 
What little commentary there is has been 
brief, focusing primarily on two main points. 
First, that the Historical Section was given more 
duties than it could practically carry out. In 
addition to compiling the official history, the 
Section was charged with the collection and 
classification of military documents, the 
publication of historical material relating to the 
military history of Canada, rendering assistance 
to the British official historian, the Imperial War 
Graves Commission and private historians. 4 
Secondly, that production was hampered by the 
lack of professional historians, with the Section's 
staff being composed of a mixture of civilian 
employees and serving army personnel, most of 
whom had no specialized historical training. 
Indeed, the presence of professional historians 
is widely viewed as instrumental in the later 
success of Canadian official histories. In the 
words on one former head of the Directorate of 
History, it has "made the difference between the 
quality and quantity of official history after the 
First and Second World Wars."5 
Related to the latter point is the extent to 
which Duguid is personally to blame for the 
failure of the project. HistorianA.M.J. Hyatt has 
sympathetically argued that Duguid and his staff 
©Canadian Military History. Volume 10, Number 2, Spring 2001, pp.4l-54. 41 
1
Gustavson: “Fairly Well Known and Need Not be Discussed”: Colonel A.F. Dugui
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2001
[f_ 
u 
<( 
z 
Qi 
co 
c 
Q) 
~ 
>, 
.D 
0 
0 
£ 
n.. 
Colonel A. F. Duguid, Director, Historical Section, Dept. 
of National Defence. Ottawa, Ont., 19 May 1943. 
"struggled conscientiously with an enormous 
task for which they had little training and could 
rarely devote their full time," implying that 
Duguid was overwhelmed by a situation beyond 
his abilities or control. 6 In contrast, Duguid's 
most strident critic was Colonel Charles P. 
Stacey, who assumed Duguid's position as 
Director of the Historical Section in 1945. Stacey 
initially gave Duguid's work a positive review and 
even referred to it as "one of the soundest pieces 
of historical work ever produced in Canada."7 
Stacey's opinion of Duguid worsened as time 
passed, however, and the depiction in Stacey's 
memoir is hardly complimentary, with the early 
drafts even less so. Privately, Stacey was even 
harsher in his criticism, maintaining that Duguid 
was more interested in heraldry than history, 
was unqualified as an historian, official or 
otherwise, and that his failed efforts had proven 
to be an "expensive fiasco" and "a millstone 
around my neck for years. "8 Conversely, a recent 
examination concludes that while poor staff 
choices were made, the real culprit was the 
'malaise militaire' that gripped Canada 
immediately following the Great War. 9 
Yet these conclusions, however persuasive, 
lack depth; moreover, by focusing on Duguid's 
42 
shortcomings, historians have ignored or 
overlooked several other important factors 
contributing to the Section's failure. In fact, the 
Historical Section's problems can best be 
understood not as the result of incompetence, 
indifference and overwork, but instead as a 
management failure. Put simply, the failure was 
the result of several factors: government neglect 
and military indifference, when combined with 
Duguid's particular and painstaking 
methodology and his inability to effectively 
manage and prioritize the duties of the Historical 
Section, resulted in an unfocused effort and 
ultimately forced the end of the project. 
* * * * * 
1\ rcher Fortescue Duguid (Scotty or Forty to 
r1his friends) was born at Boutrie House, 
Arberdeenshire, Scotland on 31 August 1887 to 
Peter and Isabel Barclay Duguid. He attended 
Aberdeen Grammar School and in 1901 entered 
Fettes College in Edinburgh. In 1906 he traveled 
to Canada in order to attend McGill University 
and study engineering, graduating in 1912. 10 
Intent on pursuing a military career he 
successfully passed the British Army entrance 
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examinations in 1910 and was given a temporary 
commission in the Royal Canadian Horse 
Artillery for the purpose of qualifying for a 
commission in the Imperial Army. However, his 
military ambitions were temporarily set aside 
in favour of employment with Grand Trunk 
Pacific and the Montreal Tunnel and Terminal 
Company. Only in June 1914 did he resume his 
military service by accepting a commission in 
the 39th Outremont Field Battery. 11 
Like so many other Canadians in 1914, he 
promptly enlisted when war was declared and 
went on to a varied and distinguished career in 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF). He 
traveled to England with the First Canadian 
Contingent on the staff of the 2nd Brigade 
Canadian Field Artillery and landed in France 
with 1st Canadian Division in February 1915. 
After participating in the battles of Second Ypres, 
Festubert, and Givenchy, he was invalided sick 
to England. Following his recovery, Duguid was 
promoted Captain and posted to the 23rd 
Howitzer Battery and served with this unit 
through the 1916 battles of St. Eloi, Mount 
Sorrel, and the Somme. 12 Shortly before the 
battle ofVimy Ridge he was again promoted and 
assigned to 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery 
as Brigade Major. In June 1917 he was wounded 
but remained on duty and was present for 
operations at Hill 70 and Passchendaele. Duguid 
was then posted to the headquarters of 3rd 
Canadian Division as GSO 2 in April 1918 and 
served as a staff officer until the armistice. 
During the war he was twice mentioned in 
dispatches and was awarded the Distinguished 
Service Order in June 1918. 13 By all accounts, 
his was a successful and capable war service 
record. 
In June 1919 Duguid was assigned to 
Canadian Corps Headquarters in England for 
medical reasons and began duty with the 
Canadian War Narrative Section (CWNS). The 
CWNS was an historical organization established 
in late 1918 by an agreement between Sir Arthur 
Currie and the Overseas Ministry. Under the 
command of Brigadier-General Raymond 
Brutinel, GOC Canadian Machine Gun Corps, 
the CWNS was to write a detailed narrative of 
the Canadian Corps during the Hundred Days 
of 1918. 14 After helping to research and write 
Currie's 1918 Report of Operations, Duguid 
returned to Canada later that same year and 
under the terms of Privy Council Order 1 736 
was retained for the special purpose of 
completing an historical account of the CEF. With 
the merger of the CWNS and the His tori cal 
Section in 1921, he was promoted Colonel and 
made director, a position he held until the end 
of the Second World War. He retired from the 
army in 194 7, received an OBE a year later and 
remained active, publishing a history of the 
Canadian Grenadier Guards in 1965. Colonel 
Duguid died on 4 January 1976 in Kingston, 
Ontario; he was 88. 15 
* * * * * 
Perhaps the most common misconception about Duguid is that he was incompetent 
and/ or indifferent to his appointed task. when, 
if anything. the opposite was the case. In fact, 
Duguid was an ardent Canadian nationalist who 
had very specific ideas about the purpose of an 
official history and history itself. In the preface 
to the official history, Duguid stated that he 
hoped it would provide "a memorial to 
participants, a source for historians, a manual 
for soldiers. and a guide for the future." 16 It was 
not an accident that providing a memorial was 
foremost on his list of objectives as Duguid 
believed that the war had been a "national epic" 
and that accurately documenting the CEF's 
exploits was "a duty to the dead and to 
generations yet unborn. " 17 Key to any 
understanding of Duguid is this notion that 
history's primary purpose was commemoration. 
As an 'old original' of the CEF, Duguid also had 
a personal interest in commemorating the fallen 
and ensuring that their deeds would not be 
forgotten. As he explained to the Canadian 
Historical Association in 1935: 
Not the least of the functions of history is the 
preservation of the tradition of self-sacrifice, and 
the transmission to posterity of that precious 
heritage so dearly bought in battle overseas 
during the most momentous years in Canadian 
history. 18 
He therefore attempted to write history that he 
would be understood," ... 100, 200, 1000 years 
hence." This would seem to be incompatible with 
telling the truth, but like his Australian 
counterpart, C.E.W. Bean, Duguid saw no 
contradiction between historical accuracy and 
nationalist commemoration and hoped that 
lessons would be learned from his account. 19 
43 
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Duguid was also a proponent of a much older 
ideal, the militia myth. This enduring and ill-
defined principle which, among other things, 
included a kind of Social Darwinism 
emphasizing that the typical Canadian soldier 
was of a breed apart from other combatants, a 
volunteer toughened by the pioneer life with 
which even the most urban Canadians were 
somehow familiar. Canadians were, in Duguid's 
eyes, "physically strong to endure, mentally alert 
and independent, spiritually fearless and 
confident in God's mercy as men are who daily 
come into contact with the forces of nature." In 
an early manuscript and in several articles, 
Duguid expounded on these themes, often 
mentioning the soldiers' civilian backgrounds, 
singling out Canadian innovations and generally 
explaining success in terms of national 
character. 20 
The evidence indicates that Duguid viewed 
himself and the Historical Section as not only 
the chroniclers of the Great War but also the 
custodians of its memory. As self-appointed 
memory guardian, Duguid had difficulty 
concentrating solely on one task as he felt his 
supervision or intervention was necessary to 
ensure the accuracy of any and all information 
regarding the CEF. Therefore, it was perfectly 
reasonable - if not imperative - to spend time 
crafting detailed answers to enquiries, 
proofreading regimental histories, and closely 
monitoring what the British official historian was 
writin about Canadian forces in British 
44 
histories. Many of these were significant 
undertakings; for instance, battle honours 
research began in 1923, at one point occupied 
nearly the entire staff, and was not fully 
completed untill932. 21 
It was this same feeling of duty or 
responsibility that prompted Duguid's 
involvement in the Memorial Chamber of the 
Peace Tower. Duguid was initially to write only a 
series of inscriptions for the project but later 
submitted a plan for the entire design that was 
approved and which replaced the original. With 
his specialized knowledge of heraldry, Duguid 
devised a complex arrangement of inscriptions, 
symbols, devices and figures from the CEF and 
earlier Canadian history, all intended to provoke 
a sense of continuity between past and present 
and to provide a memorial of national sacrifice. 
This was obviously a very personal project for 
Duguid and he spent a great deal of time 
designing and supervising the implementation 
of the over 800 separate carvings. Duguid is also 
credited with proposing the idea for the Book of 
Remembrance, which he claimed, was inspired 
by a passage in the Book of Malachi. He also 
assisted in its planning and production - a task 
that was not completed until 1942.22 
The results of these endeavors were not 
inconsequential; in addition to settling battle 
honours and designing the Memorial Chamber, 
the Section had, by 1929, sorted and indexed 
135 tons of records, indexed over 7, 000 
left: Examining the Book of Remembrance- Col. Duguid, 
Dr. Lanctot, J.W. Flanagan, W.L. Mackenzie King, 
Col. Osborne and Sylvia Bury. 
Below: Design on ceiling of the Memorial Chamber. 
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photographs, answered approximately 8,000 
enquiries, and composed inscriptions for 
numerous war memorials. In all, the Historical 
Section had compiled 6,432 pages of material, 
150 maps, 4,288 charts and 12,000 cards, but 
no official history. 2:3 
The Historical Section's problem remained 
a mandate that encouraged these extraneous 
activities, as it provided a range of duties without 
establishing clear priorities. The various tasks 
assigned the Section have been noted in a 
number of sources, but the exact terms of 
reference have never been published or 
examined in detail; yet, because they offer insight 
into the Section's later difficulties it is worthwhile 
reproducing them to better explain their 
significance. Privy Council Order 1652 of 21 May 
1921 empowered the Historical Section to carry 
out the following functions. 
(a) The collection, classification, co-ordination, 
preservation and safe custody of all war diaries. 
reports, official and other correspondence, 
maps, plans and other documents or material 
containing information and data relating to the 
participation of Canada and the Canadian 
Military Forces in the Great War. 
(b) The compilation and publication of a 
complete official history of the Recruiting. 
Organization, Mobilization, Equipment and 
Services of the Canadian Expeditionary Force 
in Canada from the 4th August. 1914, to the 
completion of demobilization and the further 
records as defined in the aforesaid Order in 
Councilof17thJanuary 1917(P.C. 19). 24 
(c) The compilation and publication of a 
complete official historical account of the 
services of the Military Forces of Canada in the 
Great War out of Canada. This History will be 
supplemented by more detailed histories of the 
work of certain technical branches of the service. 
(d) The preparation and publication of 
Historical monographs. as required, on special 
military subjects connected with the History of 
Canada. 
(e) The compilation of such military historical 
information and data relating to Canada as may 
be required from time to time by the Historical 
Section (Military Branch) of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence. 
([) The preparation of location ledgers for 
Canadian military units serving in the Field 
during the late War and the supply of necessary 
data to the Imperial War Graves Commission 
and the Honours and Awards Branch of the 
Record Office. 
(g) The supply of information from the records 
in its custody to properly accredited historical 
investigators and the facilitation of their 
research. 25 
Little fault can be found with regard to the first 
task as the arrangement of records would be 
necessary for an official history, but several 
problems are immediately apparent in the 
others. First, the decision to divide the history 
into separate series for activities within and 
outside of Canada was an obvious error. It would 
mean, for example, that the story of the First 
Contingent's experiences at Valcartier in Canada 
and Salisbury Plain in England - although 
interconnected - would be contained not only 
in separate volumes, but also in separate series 
with no guarantee of simultaneous publication. 
The mistake would eventually be corrected but 
its inclusion in the initial terms of reference is a 
telling indication of the inexperience displayed 
by the government and the Historical Section in 
planning the official history. Second, the 
remaining tasks - such as the preparation of 
monographs - were vaguely defined, and the 
scope and duration of the assistance to the 
British Historical Section and private historians 
was open to interpretation. Third and most 
important, there was no firm prioritization of 
the Section's duties. Under the order-in-council, 
the preparation of location ledgers was 
potentially equal in importance to the official 
history. Indeed, Duguid would later claim that 
the Section had been given a dual purpose: 
supply "authentic information concerning the 
military history of Canada" and codify that into 
an official military history. 26 A final oversight was 
the failure to establish target dates for the 
publication of volumes or the history as a whole. 
Such a plan, however tentative, would have given 
the official history precedence and provided 
much needed guidance to the Historical Section. 
Yet, even when focused on the official history, 
progress was hampered by the manner in which 
Duguid approached research. Considerable time 
was spent writing monographs and other 
specialized accounts to be used as quick 
reference guides when writing the official history. 
Duguid hoped these stand-alone narratives could 
be inserted into the narrative or included in an 
appendices volume. As a result, a great deal of 
material was prepared, some of it of high quality, 
but again, no official historyY 
45 
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'The German Poison Belt: Colour-Effects of the Enemy's Diabolical Asphyxiating Gases near Ypres." by John De G. 
Bryan, supplement to the Illustrated London News. 
Perhaps because of his engineering 
background, Duguid also tended to approach 
history in scientific terms and felt that the: 
Objecl is to find out exactly what happened: 
conclusions cannot be drawn until all 
information has been arranged in such a form 
that il can be grasped readily and the relative 
importance of events weighed. Otherwise 
conclusions will be faulty and probably entirely 
wrong."" 
He felt that past historians had been 
hampered by a lack of reliable information and 
had engaged in excessive speculation. Such 
supposition could be avoided, Duguid thought, 
due to the sheer volume and accuracy of 
documentary evidence available for the Great 
War. Given the mass of documents, research was 
then primarily a refinement process and an 
attempt to create control points in order to 
construct a broad outline into which additional 
or new information could be easily inserted. 
From this framework, detailed chapter and 
paragraph sketches were arranged, drafts 
prepared, circulated to reviewers for comment 
and changes incorporated.29 Letting individuals 
and actions speak for themselves, Duguid hoped 
to tell the story of his old comrades in arms, not 
pass judgement. 
Another important aspect of Duguid's 
methodology was the incorporation of oral and 
written testimony from the actual participants 
into the history. Duguid believed that this was a 
46 
vital component of his account and spent 
considerable time corresponding with and 
interviewing surviving CEF officers. Many also 
lent him their diaries and personal papers and 
permitted copies to be made of relevant 
information. In requesting information. Duguid 
was often quick to add that he recognized the 
sensitive nature of the material and would treat 
it with the utmost discretion. To others like Sir 
Richard Turner, former GOC of 2nd Canadian 
Division, Duguid gave assurances that the 
personal relations between officers would not 
be discussed. Some respondents. however, had 
no wish to participate in what they viewed as 
useless controversies and cautioned him against 
reopening old wounds. 30 
Duguid recognized that every event 
invariably produced numerous, often 
contradictory viewpoints, and he was deeply 
skeptical of many anecdotes, believing that 
assumptions and beliefs were often remembered 
as facts. He therefore tended to treat information 
gathered in this manner critically; one might 
even say too critically, as he did not consider 
personal testimony as accurate or as important 
as documentary evidence such as war diaries 
and original messages. This was because it 
"generally lacked the brilliance or historical value 
of an impartial field message smeared with the 
mud of a F.L.T." He also rated the recollections 
of senior commanders and their staffs higher 
than those of front-line soldiers, as they alone 
knew the dispositions and interactions of units. 01 
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This is a valid approach, but one is left with the 
strong impression that Duguid, a former staff 
officer, was in part responding to postwar claims 
of incompetence in the higher direction of the 
war. 32 
Duguid's approach to history had many 
advantages; first and foremost it yielded a wealth 
of information. One of the strengths of the 
Official History is its encyclopedic nature in 
which almost every aspect of Canada and the 
CEF between August 1914 and September 1915 
is covered in some fashion. This painstaking fact-
checking had another benefit as it allowed 
Duguid to uncover attempts, deliberate or 
otherwise, to omit or alter evidence. In the 
transcribed notes of an interview with Sir 
Richard Turner, for example, 
Duguid was able to add a 
that at one point the CEF required 15,000 sets 
of razors (with cases) and 300,000 hand 
towels. 34 
However, the difficulty in compiling an 
official history lies not so much in research but 
in presentation, as 'truth' is a matter of 
perspective, opinion, available evidence, and all 
other manner of factors, including race, gender, 
social class and other intangibles. So while 
Duguid was often able to determine 'what 
actually happened,' what could be published was 
another matter. His stated desire to memorialize 
the achievements of Canadian soldiers, but to 
also tell the complete story, were further 
complications as they frequently worked at 
cross-purposes. For example, Desmond Morton 
astutely points out that with the exceptions 
of Hong Kong, and Dieppe, 
number of points that Turner 
had either neglected to mention 
or claimed to have no memory 
of, including several angry 
exchanges with Lieutenant-
General E.A.H. Alderson and 
Turner's unwillingness to 
withdraw the charge that 1st 
Canadian Division had 
neglected the :Jrct Infantry 
Brigade during Second 
Ypres.:n 
GENEHAJ. SER.fFS V 
. • OL. I. AUG. 1914 - SEPT. 1.915 
more Canadians 
surrendered at Second 
Ypres than in any other 
battle in the 20th century. 35 
But the notion of Canadian 
soldiers surrendering did 
not accord with Duguid's 
ideas of Canadians as 
fearless, determined 
combatants. Consequently, 
the number of Canadians 
taken prisoner during the 
COLON£I uv 
• A. FORTEscuE nucum 
Although thorough and 
accurate, this process was 
not one that could be 
completed quickly and 
appears to have been 
lumped in with the other 
tasks - real and imagined 
- of the Historical Section. 
Moreover, while accuracy is a laudable goal, there 
is a difference between scholarly exactitude and 
a descent into petty detail, a distinction that 
Duguid never seems to have fully comprehended. 
He even once admitted that "getting it right" had 
become something of an obsession; in the 
process, Duguid appears to have 'missed the 
forest for the trees' at times as the value of some 
of the minutia contained in volume one and 
prepared for future volumes is questionable. Is 
it truly necessary to know that the average price 
of horses in the First Contingent was $172.45 
and that each was inoculated with a prophylactic 
streptococcus? Equally suspect is the knowledge 
never do 
battle is not included in the 
Official History. The only 
reference to be found is one 
line in an excerpt from the 
German Official History in the 
appendices volume. Canadians 
are only depicted as being 
captured when wounded or 
overcome by weight of numbers, 
they willingly surrender. :H; 
Nor was Duguid opposed to softening 
evidence or downplaying events in favour of 
individuals. In a lengthy dispute over Currie's 
actions at Second Ypres with the British Official 
Historian, Brigadier-General Sir James 
Edmonds, Duguid deliberately withheld 
information pointing to the probable destruction 
of 1st Canadian Division's war diary as he 
distrusted Edmonds willingness to handle it with 
the proper restraint. 37 Likewise, Duguid 
admitted that out of consideration for Turner 
the whole truth of his conduct at Second Ypres, 
47 
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particularly his confused withdrawal to the GHQ 
line on 24 April 1915, had not been told. Instead. 
it was his policy to divert attention to either the 
"higher command, or to the brilliant fighting of 
the troops, or to a flank" when dealing with 
Turner's mistakes. 38 Concealing the worst errors 
of individuals was not limited to Turner or even 
the official history. Duguid also altered a passage 
in Ralph Hodder Williams' regimental history of 
the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 
in order to avoid criticism of an officer with an 
otherwise fine war record, and suggested 
changes to other regimental historians. At times, 
however, Duguid found that his official position 
made pointed criticism difficult and he once 
remarked that many of his criticisms would be 
too devastating to print. 39 
It is wrong, though, to simply dismiss 
Duguid's work as parochial and assume that he 
covered up every unpleasant aspect of the war. 
To his credit he refused to exclude the 
controversy relating to the Ross Rifle as Turner 
suggested. Some battlefield praise was added in 
response to criticism, but his discussion of the 
rifle's history and deficiencies is quite frank and 
remains essential reading for anyone interested 
in the subject.~ 0 He also included figures 
indicating a high rate of venereal disease among 
Canadian troops and the problems encountered 
in supplying reinforcements to existing units. 
The early mismanagement of the war was 
mentioned and Duguid even suggested that the 
demands and consequences of modem war were 
not fully comprehended in 1915.41 Unfortunately, 
Duguid's inclusion of a mass of detail, his dry 
prose, and tendency to limit the text to a 
straightforward and uncritical narrative, has 
obscured many of his relevant points. 
* * * * * 
I f Duguid's priorities and methodology slowed progress on the official history, some of the 
responsibility for this lack of production and 
focus must also lie with the army and successive 
governments. As the architects of the Section's 
overall structure, both were slow to react to 
obvious problems. During the war the 
government had been content to rely upon the 
efforts of the flamboyant Sir Max Aitken (later 
Lord Beaverbrook) and Dominion archivist, 
Arthur Doughty, to ensure the documentation 
of the Canadian war effort, waiting until just after 
48 
the armistice to finally establish an Historical 
Section.c~" Although supportive in principal, a 
series of ministers who were uninterested in the 
defence portfolio meant that a coherent policy 
was, in Stacey's words, "somewhat slow in 
crystallizing."43 This is, in fact, a rather generous 
assessment as the government's actions suggest 
that there was never a clear policy of any kind. 
Having created a Historical Section the 
government then allowed three years to lapse 
before providing it with a mandate. Even then, 
there was little direction to clarify the Historical 
Section's official role, with Duguid and his staff 
being saddled with a number of miscellaneous 
and wide-ranging duties unconnected to the 
official history. Viewing the Section as a 
temporary organization, the government also 
ignored or turned down numerous requests by 
Duguid to have his staff made permanent, 
prompting several to resign or request transfers. 
Not until 1940 were the civilian employees -
some of whom had been 'temporary' for over 17 
years- finally granted permanent status.14 
Added to this general indifference was the 
acrimonious atmosphere in the newly-created 
Department of National Defence. Intended to 
increase inter-service cooperation and reduce 
administration costs in a period of 
retrenchment, the department came into being 
on 1 January 1923. Problems immediately arose 
as the new Chief of Staff, Major-General J.H. 
MacBrien, sought to subordinate the interests 
of the air force and the navy to those of the army 
in order to maintain the army's place as the 
senior service. The Director of the Naval Service, 
Commodore Walter Hose, strongly objected to 
this and the ensuing feud between the two 
effectively paralyzed the department until 
MacBrien's resignation in June 1927. 45 This 
episode was particularly damaging to the 
Historical Section as it occurred at time when it 
needed direction to where its efforts should be 
focused. Indeed, successive ministers did not 
provide this guidance, and MacBrien, 
preoccupied with departmental in-fighting and 
plagued with financial difficulties, could offer 
infrequent assistance only. 
MacBrien's resignation returned a semblance 
of order to the Department and with it a renewed 
interest in the Historical Section and a chance 
to redress the neglect of the previous years. In 
early 1928 Duguid even responded to one query 
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PROPOSED SCHEME OF GENERAL VOLUMES 
The Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-19191 
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Ypres 1915 
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Outbreak of War 
Arrival of the 4th Division 
Battles of the SOMME 
Overseas Ministry Formed 
Munitions 
Volume 6 
Amiens 1918 
March 1918-Aug 1918 
The German March Offensive and the 
Battle of AMIENS Raising the 1st Contingent, Valcartier 
Salisbury Plain: France 
YPRES. 1915 
Volume4 
Vimy 1917 
Reorganization of Engineers and M.G. 
R.R. Troops 
FESTUBERT 
GIVENCHY 
Jan 1917-0ct 1917 
Trench Warfare Volume 7 
Arras- Mons, 1918 
Volume 2 
5th Canadian Division 
VIMY Aug 1918-Nov 1918 
ARRAS HILL 70 The Salient, 1915-1916 
September 1915 -August 1916 
Holding the Line 
First Canadian Railway Troops CAMBRA\ 
VALENCIENNES 
Arrival of the 2nd Cdn Div and MONS 
formation of a Corps 
3rd Cdn Div- Cdn Cav Bde Mounted 
ST.ELO\ 
Volume 5 
Passchendaele 191 7 Volume 8 
Nov 1918- 1920 
MOUNT SORREL 
Forestry 
C.O.R.C.C. 
Oct 191 7 - March 1918 
PASSCHENDAELE and its lessons 
Reorganization 
The Rhine -return to Canada 
Siberia- Murmansk- Archangel-
Palestine -Dunsterforce 
Reorganization 
Recruiting 
Tunneling 
Volume 3 
The Somme 1916 
Aug 1916-Jan 1917 
The Somme 
Canadians in Air Services 
M.S.A. 
L Duguid to CGS, (Foulkes), 15 January 1946, File 2, DBF. 
by predicting the publication of the first volume 
in the next year, if the Section's workload was 
reduced. The Defence Minister J.L. Ralston was 
not so optimistic and authorized a committee 
to investigate the Historical Section. 
Unfortunately, settling the committee's 
composition proved problematic and it took 
some months before it was finally concluded. 
Eventually it came to include Henry Marshall 
Tory, President of the National Research Council, 
as chairman, and Major-General H. C. Thacker, 
Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Adam Shortt, 
Chairman of the Historical Documents 
Publication Board, Norman Rodgers, later 
Minister of National Defence (1939-1940), and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilfred Bovey, Director of 
Extra-Mural Relations for McGill University, 
formerly the commander of the Canadian 
Section at GHQ. And in what seems a conflict of 
interest, one of Duguid's assistants, Captain 
Frank Cummins, acted as the Committee's 
secretary.46 
The Committee finally convened for three 
days in late December 1928 and issued its report 
early in the New Year. Among other things, it 
recommended that the history should be written 
and an advisory board appointed to oversee its 
production. What likely alarmed Duguid was the 
Committee's view that the official history should 
not emphasize military history, instead focusing 
on the war's social, political and economic 
impact. The strictly military aspects of war, the 
Committee felt, could be dealt with in several 
subsidiary volumes but should still emphasize 
the war as a national struggle. Exactly what form 
the history would take- one volume or a series 
of volumes- the Committee did not say. There 
was also no mention of a timetable for its 
completion, although Bovey later explained to 
the new CGS, Major-General A.G.L. 
McNaughton, that they thought it would take 
seven or eight years. The Committee also wished 
to appoint a professional historian to the task, 
relegating Duguid to the role of research 
assistant. 47 
Fortunately for Duguid, none of the proposed 
changes went beyond the planning stages as 
McNaughton questioned some of the 
Committee's findings and enthusiastically 
endorsed Duguid as the right man for the job. 48 
McNaughton's praise may have been influenced 
by the fact that he and Duguid had served 
together and he (and no doubt others) must have 
been uneasy at the prospect of an 'official' 
49 
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monograph from someone other than a serving 
officer. As a result, no attempts were made to 
modify the Committee's findings and in the 
absence of any firm direction, very little changed 
and the Historical Section continued to operate 
much as it always had. Duguid even reversed 
his previous recommendation that the Section's 
work be reduced and for the next three years it 
continued with its many duties. That is, until 
McNaughton and Duguid interpreted a brief May 
I932 statement by the Minister of National 
Defence Donald M. Sutherland, as an official 
appointment and finally got down to the business 
ofwriting. 49 
The publication of volume one in I938 
seemed to herald a new beginning for the 
Historical Section and Duguid reported that 
work on the second volume was progressing 
steadily. Yet the outbreak of the Second World 
War sounded what would be the death knell for 
both Duguid and the Great War history. Even 
while urged to redouble his efforts, work on the 
history was almost immediately suspended as 
the demands of the current conflict inevitably 
limited the time that could be devoted to 
researching and writing it, despite the more than 
doubling of the Historical Section's staff by 
I944. 50 In many ways this was simply a 
continuation of the problems of the I920s and 
30s as official policy and Duguid's own priorities 
prevented any meaningful work on the history. 
Things appeared to turn around in I945 
when Stacey was appointed Director of the 
Historical Section and Duguid was given a 
separate directorate with no responsibilities 
other than finishing his series. There was a sense 
of urgency to this move as Duguid had only about 
two more years to serve before retirement and 
was considered the only man capable of 
completing the job. 51 The feasibility of finishing 
the remaining seven volumes in two years, when 
it had taken I 7 years to publish the first, appears 
not to have been seriously considered. Duguid, 
on the other hand, did not think it could be 
concluded in two years, regarded the deadline 
as a target date, and therefore devoted his time 
to laying the groundwork for his successor. 52 
Why the General Staff did not clarify their 
position or even seem to notice what Duguid was 
doing was partly due to the fact that Duguid's 
establishment was now but a subsection of a 
larger organization, one traditionally regarded 
50 
with some ambivalence. As well, there were the 
greater and more immediate problems 
associated with reorganizing the Department of 
National Defence and demobilizing and 
repatriating the overseas army. 
Surprisingly though, the final decision to 
cancel the official history was made by the army 
itself. Faced with certain cuts in defence spending 
in I946, the CGS, Lieut.-General Charles 
Foulkes, directed his vice chief, Major-General 
C.C. Mann, to investigate the plans for both the 
First and Second World War Histories, the 
results of which were anything but encouraging. 
Mann recommended -and Foulkes concurred -
that Duguid's section cease operations, be 
disbanded as of I January I94 7 and its records 
deposited in the Public Archives of Canada. Both 
had balked at the total projected cost of the 
official history- over a half million dollars - at 
time when the armed forces were struggling to 
allocate scarce resources. Poor sales of Duguid's 
and Sir Andrew Macphail's medical history were 
also cited as evidence of little public interest in 
any such history and provided another 
compelling reason for its cancellation. 53 Foulkes 
also argued that advances in warfare had 
rendered any study of the First World War 
unnecessary. The Great War was, in effect, old 
news, and any lessons, Foulkes reasoned, could 
be gleaned from existing works, even if none had 
a Canadian perspective. Perhaps as W.A.B. 
Douglas has suggested, with little experience in 
using history for its own institutional purposes, 
the Canadian military felt it could forego the 
effort - and the expense. 54 Duguid's plea to 
reconsider the decision proved futile and in the 
ensuing budgets cuts the CEF history, along with 
the burgeoning historical programs of the Royal 
Canadian Navy and Air Force were eliminated 
with only Stacey's army history surviving. 55 
* * * * * 
Official historians, Sir Herbert Butterfield remarked, "get the reward that is certainly 
due to them". What Butterfield meant was that 
those historians with access to the "charmed 
circle", as he deemed it, of government officials, 
institutions and restricted documents, who fail 
to resist the "soft charms ... and subtle 
comfortable chains" of their position, deserve 
the historical censure they so often receive. 56 
Written over fifty years ago, Butterfield's 
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observations about the pitfalls of official history 
still resonate, but does Duguid deserve the 
disdain and ignominy that many seem to feel 
for him and his efforts? 
It should be obvious that Duguid was a much 
better historian than Stacey and others have 
made him out to be. While Duguid's methodology 
was idiosyncratic, his notes and drafts show a 
sophistication of thought previously 
unacknowledged, and a keen awareness of the 
problems involved with interpreting evidence. 
Despite this reevaluation, few modem historians 
would agree with his views on the infallibility of 
documents. Moreover, Duguid was prone to 
generalize the experiences of soldiers to fit his 
own nationalist ideals, which led him to either 
alter evidence or place it in appendices to hide 
discreditable events. Similarly, pressure exerted 
on him by individuals, plus his own personal 
loyalty towards senior officers, resulted in the 
concealment of Currie's and Turner's worst 
errors. Still, to dismiss the entirety of his work 
on these grounds is to ignore his real qualities 
as a historian. A close examination of the official 
history reveals that much of what Duguid wrote 
is still relevant and the official history arguably 
remains the single best source for the early 
history of the CEF. 57 In evaluating Duguid it is 
also useful to remember that he was not an 
academic historian or a veteran turned author 
like Will Bird, who was able to freely express 
his opinions, but an official historian with all 
the advantages and constraints of that position. 5 8 
Although the analogy can be carried too far, 
the plight of the Historical Section in the 1920s 
and 30s paralleled that of the army itself as both 
were in need of guidance that was not 
forthcoming. 59 The Historical Section's 1921 
reorganization provided little direction due to 
its vague terms of reference and myriad of 
supplementary duties. This problem was 
compounded by the general staff's 
preoccupation with their own political battles 
and successive ministers who did not know what 
the Section was doing and had little inclination 
to find out. For his part, Duguid interpreted 
many of his responsibilities in the broadest 
manner possible and, at times, went out of his 
way to take on extra work. It would seem, 
therefore, that the Historical Section's problems 
were less the result of incompetence or 
indifference than they were of mismanagement 
at all levels. 
This failure, however, was not preordained 
and it must be concluded that the primary 
reason for the lack of progress was Duguid's 
mismanagement. A vague mandate and official 
indifference may have made the job more 
difficult, but these were ultimately obstacles that 
could have been overcome by Duguid and his 
staff. Indeed, faced with many of the same 
hurdles, C.E.W. Bean produced what is regarded 
as perhaps the finest First World War official 
history series. 60 In the end, it is somewhat ironic 
and unfortunate that Duguid's perfectionism and 
obsession with preserving the memory of the 
CEF actually prevented him from completing the 
one project that would have had the lasting 
impact he hoped for. 
A recent analysis of the CEF in the latter 
stages of the war concludes "neither before nor 
since have Canadians played such an effective, 
crucial and decisive role in land warfare. "61 Given 
this and the popular sentiment that the war 
proved to be Canada's 'coming of age,' Duguid's 
unfinished account must surely rank as one of 
the most regrettable episodes in the writing of 
Canadian military history. This is all the more 
telling when one considers that far from being 
the final authority that some imagined, official 
histories are often the first word and have tended 
to heavily influence the direction of subsequent 
debate. 62 One could even argue that the lack of 
an official account- Nicholson notwithstanding 
- is why Canadian First World War historians, 
until very recently, have focused on a rather 
narrow selection of topics: the heroism of 
Second Ypres, the glory ofVimy, and the genius 
of Currie. 63 For this state of affairs, Duguid bears 
a measure of responsibility and in a very real 
sense he did 'miss the boat,' although critics 
would still do well to remember Stacey's 
observation that "the task of an official historian 
is difficult at best, and in Canada perhaps 
especially so. "64 
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SICKNESS, starvation, brutality, and forced labour plagued 
the existence of tens of thousands of Allied POWs in World 
War II. More than a quarter of these POWs died in captivity. 
Long Night's Journey into Day centres on the lives of 
Canadian, British, Indian, and Hong Kong POWs captured 
at Hong Kong in December 1941 and incarcerated in camps 
in the Japanese Home Islands. Experiences of American 
POWs in the Philippines, and British and Australians POWs 
in Singapore, are interwoven throughout the book. 
Starvation and diseases such as diphtheria, beriberi, 
dysentery, and tuberculosis afflicted all these unfortunate 
men, affecting their lives not only in the camps during the 
war but after they returned home. Yet despite the dispirit-
ing circumstances of their captivity, these men found ways 
to improve their existence, keeping up their morale with 
such events as musical concerts and entertainments created 
entirely within the various camps. 
Based largely on hundreds of interviews with former 
POWs, as well as material culled from archives around the 
world, Roland details the extremes the prisoners endured. 
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